Our Troops and the American People Deserve More Than Bush's Regrets

Last night, during a televised press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Bush again failed to offer a real strategy for victory in Iraq and argued that there was no way to have predicted many of the problems that currently plague Iraq. As Memorial Day approaches, the President owes our troops and the American people more than regrets.

"Our troops and their families deserve more than the President's regrets, just as the people of the Gulf Coast deserved more than his hollow rhetoric about not knowing that the levees would break," said Democratic National Committee Communications Director Karen Finney. "The truth is that there was an abundance of evidence prior to the start of the war pointing to the strength of the insurgency and the challenges our troops would face. Unfortunately, President Bush chose to ignore that evidence. Perhaps now that the President is feeling regretful he will stop ignoring the facts on the ground and finally provide a clear plan for success. As we honor our men and women in uniform this Memorial Day, the President owes the troops and the American people more than regrets."

Bush Administration Ignored Warnings And Dismissed The Facts

Bush Administration Touted Capture of Mobile "Biological Laboratories," Declaring "We Have Found the Weapons Of Mass Destruction." "On May 29, 2003, 50 days after the fall of Baghdad, President Bush proclaimed a fresh victory for his administration in Iraq: Two small trailers captured by U.S. and Kurdish troops had turned out to be long-sought mobile "biological laboratories." He declared, "We have found the weapons of mass destruction." The claim, repeated by top administration officials for months afterward, was hailed at the time as a vindication of the decision to go to war." [Washington Post, 4/12/06]

• Even When They Knew It Was Not True. "But even as Bush spoke, U.S. intelligence officials possessed powerful evidence that it was not true. A secret fact-finding mission to Iraq -- not made public until now -- had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons. Leaders of the Pentagon-sponsored mission transmitted their unanimous findings to Washington in a field report on May 27, 2003, two days before the president's statement. The three-page field report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were stamped "secret" and shelved. Meanwhile, for nearly a year, administration and intelligence officials continued to publicly assert that the trailers were weapons factories." [Washington Post, 4/12/06]

At President Bush and Vice President Cheney's Request, Scooter Libby Leaks Previously Classified Information From the National Intelligence Estimate. Scooter Libby testified that he was specifically authorized in advance of his July 8 meeting with New York Times reporter Judith Miller to disclose portions of the classified NIE because the Vice President thought that it was "very important" for them to come out. Libby testified that while at first he advised the Vice President that he could not have this conversation with Miller because of the classified nature of the NIE, Vice President Cheney advised him that President Bush authorized Libby to disclose "the relevant portions of the NIE." Libby testified that the circumstances of his conversation with Judith Miller-getting approval from the President through the Vice President to discuss material-were "unique in his recollection." [Government's Response to Defendant's Third Motion to Compel Discovery, 4/5/06]

• Even As The Information Was Being Discredited By Other Officials In the Administration. President Bush's order authorizing Scooter Libby to reveal "previously classified intelligence about Saddam Hussein's efforts to obtain uranium came as the information was already being discredited by several other officials in the administration, interviews and documents from the time show." A senior intelligence official involved in drafting the estimate said the drafters knew there were serious doubts about the accuracy of that claim. [New York Times, 4/9/06]

High Ranking CIA Officer Said Bush and Cheney Were Told That Iraq Had No Weapons Of Mass Destruction. Tyler Drumheller, the former highest-ranking CIA officer in Europe said that, before the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in 2003, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other high ranking officials were told that Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, had told the CIA that Iraq had "no active weapons of mass destruction programs." [CNN, 4/23/06]

• But They Said They "Were No Longer Interested." "'The [White House] group that was dealing with preparation for the Iraq war came back and said they were no longer interested. And we said 'Well, what about the intel?' And they said 'Well, this isn't about intel anymore. This is about regime change.' Drumheller said the administration officials wanted no more information from Sabri because: 'The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming, and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy.'" [CNN, 4/23/06]

McCaffrey Says There Are Inadequate Forces In Iraq. General Barry McCaffrey, commander of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, told NPR: "I think we got in there with a grossly anemic military force. We never defeated the elite elements of the Saddam regime. They walked away with their guns, their money, their leadership in tact." [NPR, "Morning Edition," 4/15/04]

Army Strategist Says Bush Administration Failed In Planning Post-War Iraq. In a paper posted on the Strategic Studies Institute's website, Army Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria of the U.S. Army War College writes, the administration "either misunderstood or, worse, wished away" the difficulties of transforming that victory into the larger political goal. The senior Army strategist accused the Bush administration of seeking to win "quickly and on the cheap" while ignoring the more critical strategic aim of creating a stable, democratic nation. [Newshouse News Service, 4/13/04]

Army Secretary Warned Bush To Expect Resistance. The Washington Post reported despite the fact that "some administration officials have begun to fault the CIA and other intelligence agencies for being overly optimistic and failing to anticipate such widespread and sustained opposition to a U.S. occupation. several administration and congressional sources interviewed.said the opposite occurred. They said senior policymakers at the White House, Pentagon and elsewhere received classified analyses before the war warning about the dangers of the postwar period." Former Army Secretary Thomas White, who left office in April 2003, said of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz that, "Their view of the intelligence was much different. Their notion of it was resistance would run away as the few remaining Saddam loyalists were hunted down." [Washington Post, 9/9/03]

Secret Joint Chiefs Report Admitted Pentagon Planners Were Not Given Enough Time To Consider Reconstruction In Post-War Iraq. In August, 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a secret report called "Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned." The report, described by the Washington Times, blamed "setbacks in Iraq on a flawed and rushed war-planning process that 'limited the focus' for preparing for post-Saddam Hussein operations." The Times noted that the Joint Chiefs report "reveals discrepancies in the planning process. It says planners were not given enough time to put together the best blueprint for what is called Phase IV-the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq." [Washington Times, 9/3/03]

Shineseki Blasted By Wolfowitz For Telling the Truth. Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz criticized the Army's chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, after Shinseki told Congress in February 2004 that the occupation could require "several hundred thousand troops." Wolfowitz called Shinseki's estimate "wildly off the mark." [USA Today, 6/2/03]

• Smear of Shinseki Intimidates U.S. Generals in Iraq. The Washington Times reported, "Retired Gen. Eric Shinseki testified to Congress while he was Army chief of staff that the United States needed at least double the current occupation army to enforce peace. He quickly met a rebuke from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a key proponent of going to war to oust Saddam. Mr. Wolfowitz testified that it was not logical to say it would take more soldiers to occupy Iraq than were required to win the war. Some officers say privately that the rebuke has intimidated commanders in Iraq." [Washington Times, 4/10/04]